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Property Rights Issues in Cooperatives
Market Reports
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market

Year
Ago

4 Wks
Ago

11-11-16

135.00

97.40

103.10

213.52

126.96

137.86

183.32

132.73

128.01

218.53

182.43

185.47

53.26

47.14

40.83

75.49

72.41

73.82

155.62

150.90

142.05

356.94

352.40

3.94

2.81

2.66

3.39

3.08

2.94

8.06

8.95

8.91

5.66

4.80

4.50

2.57

2.65

2.85

185.00

160.00

145.00

75.00

68.75

67.50

77.50

67.50

65.00

125.25

109.00

107.50

51.13

41.00

41.75

360.61

Cooperative organizations (this includes clubs and
professional partnerships) play an important role in
the economy, often bridging the gap that exists between the purely public and the purely private in the
provision of goods. This has been particularly true in
agriculture, where cooperative organizations have
emerged to deal primarily with market failures such
as oligopsonistic pricing.
The collective nature of cooperative organizations
creates two key property rights issues: the free rider
problem and the horizon problem. In agricultural
cooperatives free rider problems emerge in raising
investment funds at formation and later for growth
and expansion during operation; in both cases,
members prefer to let others make the investment
but to nevertheless have access to the benefits of the
investment.
Horizon problems in agricultural cooperatives potentially arise when the period of time over which
members have a claim on the benefits of an investment is less than the length of time over which the
benefits are generated. The result of this horizon
mismatch may be underinvestment in assets or investments in assets that generate short-run benefits
and not the long-run benefits necessary to keep the
cooperative efficient and viable.
Of course, the lower investment may also be a reflection of the free rider problem that was discussed
above, making it difficult to identify the precise

cause of underinvestment. This is particularly
the case because, as shown by our research, the
two problems are linked and interact in important ways. For instance, free riding under decreasing returns to size reduces the returns to coop-
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erative investment, thus further exacerbating the horizon
problem. And reducing the horizon of cooperative investments to make them more attractive to individuals with
shorter time horizons leads to increased incentives for free
riding.
Research published in the latest issue of the Journal of Agricultural & Resource Economics examines the impact of the
horizon and free-rider problems on investment and patronage decisions and, in turn, on cooperative membership and
member welfare. Capturing the interaction of these two
property rights problems is critical in identifying the factors
affecting individual decisions and welfare, and the conditions under which cooperative investments are undertaken
when the potential for horizon and free-rider problems is
present. A full understanding of the linkage between these
two property right problems is also crucial for determining
policies and strategies that can be used to address them.
The study offers new insights on the horizon and free-rider
problems in cooperative organizations. Specifically, the
study reveals that (i) the horizon problem need not necessarily lead to short-term cooperative investments, (ii) free
riding is not necessarily a problem for cooperative organizations, (iii) the source of the horizon problem, namely different member time horizons, can help cope with the freerider problem, (iv) a properly designed membership fee can
address the free rider and horizon problems, and (v) the
optimal membership fee depends on the cooperative’s cost
structure.
Our analysis shows that although individuals differ in their
valuation of the perceived benefits from forming or patronizing the cooperative because of factors such as age, these
differences in valuations also create an opportunity to cope
with the free rider problem. Specifically, a member’s time
horizon determines whether that individual is part of a critical mass that must invest in the cooperative for it to begin
operation. The study shows that this critical mass of members is made up of people with longer time horizons. As a
consequence, at least part of the membership is provided
with an incentive to cooperate precisely because of the existence of differences in members’ time horizons.
While this critical mass of members will cooperate and invest in the cooperative under the right circumstances, the
other members will find it optimal to free ride. If the cooperative exhibits decreasing returns, then free riding is detrimental to all members. One way of reducing the free rider
problem is through the use of membership fees to members
that are not part of the original critical mass. By equating
the returns from investing in and patronizing the cooperative with those from patronizing alone, a properly designed
membership fee eliminates the incentive to free ride and
raises the benefits generated by the cooperative under decreasing returns to size.

Free riders, however, need not be bad for the organization and the original members. For instance, if the cooperative exhibits increasing returns to size, then free
riding can benefit all members by lowering costs and
creating greater benefits. Thus, allowing different members to pay different amounts to join the cooperative
organization can be advantageous.
In addition to providing insights into the membership
fee structure of cooperative organizations, our research
shows that the impact of the horizon problem may
differ from what is typically expected. While it is usually argued that the limited horizons of its members will
lead to a cooperative undertaking projects that generate
short-term rather than long-term projects, our study
shows that this need not always be the case. The reason
is that the individuals who decide to patronize and finance the cooperative are likely to have relatively longer horizons, with the result that the short-sightedness
of the cooperative is attenuated to some degree. This
result may be one reason why some cooperatives have
been able to make long-term investments and, thus,
remain competitive over time.
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